Thursday 26 November 2015

Lease vs Licence - What difference does it make? (Part 2)

Based on the public and personal feedback, our blog topic from September 2015 on the differences between leases and licences certainly seems to have been quite topical.

One reader requested that we provide some more examples for Government practitioners of circumstances where a lease or a licence might be appropriate.  Of course, the particular circumstances of the transaction will determine the form of tenure that is appropriate for the intended use of premises.  With that in mind, we provide some further examples of where a lease or licence might be appropriate for the intended use of the premises.

Lease examples

In short, a lease will be appropriate where the tenant requires exclusive use of land and/or premises for the permitted use.  Where government is the tenant, such uses include delivery of long term projects and services, for example prisons, hospitals and police and court house facilities. 

Where government is the landlord, such uses would include:
  • commercial or trading purposes where the operator will undertake a fitout and install furniture, computers, etc;
  • sensitive and important community services such as the provision of child care facilities; and
  • provision of education services, such as by a TAFE institute.

Licence examples

The granting of exclusive possession and other leasehold rights is not necessary for all land uses.  Common examples of where a licence of land may be appropriate include:
  • installation of power line infrastructure by an electricity generation company;
  • special event licences for community, cultural or sporting events;
  • site investigations for development proposals;
  • construction licences or licences for the installation of services and utility infrastructure; and
  • cutting or taking away fallen or felled trees for domestic use as firewood.

If you would like further advice regarding land use arrangements and other property issues, the VGSO Property Team is well placed to assist you.  Please contact:

Margaret Marotti
Managing Principal Solicitor
9947 1410
margaret.marotti@vgso.vic.gov.au

Anthony Leggiero
Managing Principal Solicitor
9947 1430
anthony.leggiero@vgso.vic.gov.au

Elizabeth Wortley
Senior Solicitor
9947 1433
elizabeth.wortley@vgso.vic.gov.au

Wednesday 18 November 2015

To publish or not to publish - a refresher on sub judice contempt

Recently there has been a lot of inquiries in relation to what can be published about upcoming court matters.

On occasion, it is permissible to publish material about upcoming court cases, but commonly, publishing such material may result in the publisher committing the common law offence of sub-judice contempt.

What is sub judice contempt?

Sub judice contempt is the common law offence of publishing material which has a tendency to interfere with the administration of justice while proceedings are sub judice; that is, ‘under a judge’.

The rationale for the offence is to avoid the possibility of  a ‘trial by media’ by prohibiting the publication of material which might either prejudice issues at stake in criminal proceedings, or which might influence or place pressure on persons involved in the proceedings, including jurors, witnesses or potential witnesses.

In order to prove a charge of sub judice contempt, it must be proven to the criminal standard that:
a) material was published;
b) the publication of that material happened while the proceedings were sub judice; and
c) the publication has the tendency to interfere with the administration of justice in the proceedings that are before the judge.
For more details about this common law offence and how to avoid it, read on here.

If you are a Victorian government department or agency and need to know more about sub judice contempt you can contact:

Louise Jarrett
Managing Principal Solicitor
louise.jarrett@vgso.vic.gov.au
(03) 9247 6798

Michael Stagg
Senior Solicitor
michael.stagg@vgso.vic.gov.au 
(03) 9247 6496

Friday 6 November 2015

Making sense of 'nuisance': Fertility Control Clinic v Melbourne City Council

The picketing of abortion clinics has been a hot button issue for many years in the US. Those protests are often portrayed as a 'clash' of rights between religious freedom and peaceful assembly on one hand, and a woman's right to privacy and control of her body on the other.

However, the recent Supreme Court decision in Fertility Control Clinic v Melbourne City Council shows that the extent to which rights are protected will often turn on the nature and scope of a decision maker's power under legislation.

The case also demonstrates that even though a decision maker may make a legal error, that doesn't necessarily give rise to a legal remedy.

A nuisance?

The Fertility Control Clinic provides pregnancy termination (among other services) at a private clinic in East Melbourne. For at least a decade, members of a religious group called the 'Helpers of God's Precious Infants' (or 'HoGPI', for short) have gathered outside.

The Clinic contacted Melbourne City Council claiming that HoGPI had engaged in nuisance by, among other things, harassing women as they entered the clinic, trying to block access to the clinic, and singing loudly outside consultation rooms.

In Victoria, councils have a duty to investigate a nuisance in their district under the Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008. If a council finds that a nuisance exists, it has to take certain kinds of action under the Act.

The Council wrote back to the Clinic, stating that it thought most of HoGPI's actions weren't a 'nuisance' within the meaning of the Act (other than maybe blocking entry to the clinic), and recommending that the Clinic ‘settle the matter privately’ by contacting Victoria Police.

What the clinic argued

The Clinic brought proceedings in the Supreme Court arguing that the Council failed to discharge its statutory duty by misinterpreting the meaning of 'nuisance' under the Act. The Clinic sought an order compelling the Council to address the HoGPI protests as a 'nuisance'.

The Clinic also sought a declaration that the Council's advice that the Clinic contact Victoria Police did not meet the statutory definition of 'settling the matter privately'.

Errors by the Council were within power

The Court found that – even though the Council had made a legal error in concluding that HoGPI's conduct wasn't a 'nuisance' under the Act – the Council had not failed to exercise its powers under the Act, and the Council's error was within power.

In other words, the Council had performed its duty under the Act by considering whether a nuisance existed, even if it had made a mistake by misinterpreting the meaning of 'nuisance'.  Therefore, the Court didn't make any orders compelling the Council to reconsider the Clinic's letter or address HoGPI's conduct in any particular way.

The Court also found that the Council made an error in recommending that the Clinic 'settle the matter privately' through Victoria Police. Again, however, the Council's error was within power: the Council had discharged its duty by recommending a way for the Clinic to resolve the matter privately, even if it had made a mistake by recommending a means of resolution that wasn't 'private' at all.

The Court made a declaration that referral to Victoria Police was not a method of 'settling the matter privately' under the Act.

No reliance on the Charter or constitutional issues

The Council initially raised issues under the Commonwealth Constitution and the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 2006.

The case potentially raised questions of conflicting rights under the Charter. Section 38 of the Charter requires public authorities, including councils, to act compatibly with human rights and give proper consideration to a relevant right when making a decision.

Relevant Charter rights in this context include the right to free movement, and the right not to have one’s privacy arbitrarily interfered or reputation unlawfully attacked. 

Conversely, the following Charter rights of HoGPI members were potentially engaged: freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief; freedom of expression; and the right to peaceful assembly and free association.

The Court did not have to grapple with whether the Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008 was a burden on the implied freedom of political communication under the Australian Constitution.
Ultimately, neither party relied on those arguments.

Watch this space: new buffer zone laws

A Bill making it an offence to engage in certain behaviour within 150 metres of an abortion clinic has been introduced into, and second read in, the Legislative Assembly.

Victorian Government clients wanting further information or advice can contact:

Managing Principal Solicitor
03 8684 0247

Senior Solicitor
03 8684 0425