When can you leave the past behind you?

In recent weeks, attention has been drawn to a federal election candidate in Western Australia who did not declare two spent convictions to the political party that had endorsed him as its election candidate.  The candidate has now been disendorsed by the political party and lost the opportunity to run for a seat in the Federal Parliament.
Aside from heightened scrutiny of candidates at election time, this situation raises a simple question, that does not always have a clear answer: what is a 'spent' conviction?  And in what circumstances does a person need to disclose such information to a government agency, employer or a non-government organisation?

The short answer is (in part) it will generally depend on the nature of the offence, when and where the offence was committed, and to what organisation or who you are providing the information.

What may surprise is that there is no spent conviction legislation in Victoria or formal rules that govern the disclosure of criminal history information.  However, Part VIIC of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) sets out the Commonwealth Spent Conviction Scheme.  All other jurisdictions in Australia have spent conviction schemes.

Victoria

A person's history of any Victorian criminal convictions are held by and accessed through Victoria Police.

While Victoria has recently passed legislation which provides for the expungement of certain historical homosexual offences, it does not have a general statutory regime dealing with spent convictions.

However, Victoria Police has an Information Release Policy that it applies to requests for an individual's criminal conviction history.

The Information Release Policy states that, save for certain exceptions, no details of a prior offence will be disclosed if 10 years has passed since an adult was last found guilty of an offence.  A five year waiting period applies for persons under 18 years of age.  Therefore, details of a person's prior convictions will generally not be disclosed by Victoria Police in a criminal history check once the relevant waiting period has lapsed, and in the absence of further offending.  However, an individual's criminal history remains in the records of Victoria Police.  As such, despite the Information Release Policy, Victoria Police may exercise its discretion and disclose criminal history information depending on the purpose for which the information is sought and to whom it will be disclosed (e.g. where the information is required for employment with children, the elderly or disabled persons).

Commonwealth

While Victoria does not have spent conviction legislation, Victoria Police’s Information Release Policy operates, in practice, in a similar way to the Commonwealth’s Spent Conviction Scheme in Part VIIC of the Crimes Act 1914.

Section 85ZM of the Crimes Act 1914 provides that a person's conviction for an offence will be spent if:
(a)  the person has been granted a pardon for a reason other than the person was wrongly convicted of the offence; or
(b)  the person was not sentenced to imprisonment for the offence, or was not sentenced to imprisonment for the offence for more than 30 months, and the waiting period for the offence has ended .

The scope of a person's rights and obligations under the scheme varies depending on:

• whether the conviction is for a Commonwealth, state, territory or foreign offence
• who or what type of authority or organisation knows or is being told about a spent conviction (ie a government authority or a non-government organisation)
• where the person being told is located.

Generally, the Commonwealth scheme permits a person to not disclose a spent conviction:

• to any person located in a state or territory of Australia a spent conviction for a Commonwealth offence;
• to a Commonwealth authority a spent conviction for a state, territory offence or foreign offence.

The scheme also operates to allow a person to say under oath that they have not been charged with or convicted of an offence.

However, some categories and positions of employment are excluded from the Commonwealth scheme and require that a person must declare all convictions when applying for certain positions (eg a law enforcement agency has a right to information about a person's spent convictions for the purpose of making decisions in relation to prospective employees and contractors).

Other jurisdictions

In order to determine what a person’s rights are in relation to non-disclosure of a state or territory offence in Australian jurisdictions other than Victoria, the relevant spent conviction legislation will need to be consulted.

Take home points for individuals and government authorities

When determining whether they must disclose information about a prior conviction, individuals need to carefully consider where the offence was committed, the nature of the offence, how serious it was and what period of time has passed since it was committed.  While there can be a tension between a person disclosing their prior conviction history and their ability to put their past offending behind them and privacy, in some cases, disclosure of prior convictions will always be required, or at least expected, given the reason or purpose for which they are disclosing the information.  For individuals, ensure you read the fine print on what you are required or expected to disclose about your history of prior convictions and/or disciplinary offences to a government authority or non-government organisation.

Government authorities should ensure their application and consent forms clearly advise members of the public why and when they are required to disclose their prior conviction history, including what if any spent conviction scheme applies (including relevant exceptions) and how the information will be used.  Government authorities should also ensure they comply with privacy and data protection legislation when collecting information about a person's prior convictions.  This includes having privacy policies on how such information may be collected, used and disclosed.

Further information

- Victoria Police, National Police Certificates-Information Release Policy (2016)
- Part VIIC, Division 6 of the Crimes Act 1914 and Regulations 7A and 8 and Schedule 3 of the Crimes Regulations 1990
Sentencing Amendment (Historical Homosexual Convictions Expungement) Act 2014

Joanne Kummrow
Special Counsel

Michael Williams
Solicitor

Thank you for not smoking

Think you have a right to smoke? Turns out you don't - or at least, not if you're on the premises of Thomas Embling Hospital, where a decision to implement a complete smoking ban was recently upheld by the Supreme Court in De Bruyn v Victorian Institute of Forensic Mental Health [2016] VSC 111.

The plaintiff's case 

Thomas Embling Hospital is a forensic psychiatric hospital whose patients include persons found unfit to plead or not guilty of a crime by reason of mental impairment. The plaintiff was found not guilty of the murder of his mother by reason of insanity in 1989, and has been an involuntary patient of the Hospital since the year 2000.

The plaintiff sought to challenge the Hospital's decision to implement a smoking ban on its grounds by arguing, amongst other things, that the Hospital had breached section 38 of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006. That section requires public authorities to act compatibly with human rights, and to give proper consideration to relevant human rights when making decisions. The Attorney-General, represented by the VGSO, intervened to make submissions on the application of the Charter.

The plaintiff argued that the smoking ban affected the right of all persons deprived of liberty to be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person (s 22(1) of the Charter), the right of an accused person or a person detained without charge to be treated in a way that is appropriate for a person who has not been convicted (s 22(3)), and the right not to be subjected to medical treatment without consent (s 10(c)). He also raised the property right (s 20), as he was concerned that the Hospital proposed to confiscate his smoking paraphernalia.

The decision

The Hospital and the Attorney-General argued that none of the rights identified by the plaintiff were engaged by the smoking ban. Justice Riordan agreed, finding that the ban was a comprehensive, properly considered policy adopted after extensive consultation with patients, and although it was likely to cause some distress to the plaintiff, its purpose was to protect patients, staff and visitors from the harmful effects of smoking.  It did not interfere with the plaintiff's dignity or humanity, and further, it did not constitute 'medical treatment' as it did not involve any direct interference with the body or state of mind of an individual.

His Honour found that the plaintiff was neither 'accused' nor 'a person detained without charge' for the purposes of the right in s 22(3), and even if he were, the smoking ban did not constitute inappropriate treatment for an unconvicted person. Finally, his Honour held that the right to property was not engaged because there was no evidence that Mr de Bruyn would be permanently deprived of his smoking paraphernalia. The plaintiff's application was dismissed.

What is 'proper consideration'?

Justice Riordan's decision includes a helpful summary of what it means to give 'proper consideration' to relevant human rights. Key things for decision-makers to remember are:

• You must seriously turn your mind to the possible impact of a decision on a person's human rights.
• If the decision may limit rights, you must identify the countervailing interests or obligations that would justify the limit.
• It's not enough to provide a 'pro forma' explanation of the impact on Charter rights - giving human rights proper consideration is more than just a box-ticking exercise.
• On the other hand, you don't need to identify the 'correct' right or specific Charter provision, or explain the content of a right by reference to legal principles or jurisprudence. You only need to identify in general terms the nature and extent of the effect on the person's rights.
• After identifying the actual rights affected, you must balance the competing private and public interests to determine if any limit is justifiable. There is no formula for this exercise - it will depend on the circumstances. Justice Riordan reiterated earlier judicial statements that this process should not be scrutinised overzealously by the courts.

Consider the evidence

The Hospital's evidence in this matter, which included evidence that the Hospital had consulted extensively with patients and sought specific legal advice on Charter issues, is a great example of a public authority being able to show genuine attention being given to Charter rights.

Of course, this level of evidence won't always be necessary, particularly for day-to-day decisions with only minor rights impacts. However, if you're making a decision that will affect human rights, it's helpful to think about how you might demonstrate that you've given those rights proper consideration in case it later becomes an issue. Depending on the nature of the decision, you may find that a quick file note, a chat with the affected person could save a lot of trouble down the track. For more significant interferences with rights, you may wish to consider preparing a formal rights impact assessment, or even seeking legal advice to ensure that your decision is compatible with your obligations under the Charter.


If you work in the Victorian public service and require further information on this case or advice on your human rights obligations, please contact:

Eleanor Thomas

Senior Solicitor

8684 0425      

Catherine Roberts

Managing Principal Solicitor

8684 0247

Charter review handed down today!

The 2015 Review of the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities was handed down today.

The Charter Review 2015 is titled 'From Commitment to Culture' and looks at ways to make the Charter more accessible, effective, and practical.

The Review contains a number of recommendations that may herald an exciting new era for the Charter, including:

• a separate cause of action (minus damages) to VCAT
• dispute resolution procedures via the Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission, and
• a range of other initiatives and amendments.

We look forward to the Government's response to the Review.

For more information about the Charter Review 2015, or the Charter and its application to Victorian Government clients, please contact:

Catherine Roberts
Managing Principal Solicitor
03 8684 0427

Sporting chance for all - Equality for transgender people in sport and work

The recent media coverage of a high profile rugby union player reporting the use of derogatory slurs on-field highlights the issue of discrimination in sport.  This incident is timely as, in January, the Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission (VEOHRC) released a new guideline titled Transgender People and Sport.  This follows the release of the previous guideline, Transgender People at Work (updated in July 2014).

The Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (EO Act) protects transgender and intersex people from discrimination on the basis of their gender identity in a number of areas of public life.  In addition to sport and work, these include education, provision of goods and services, accommodation and clubs.

New guidelines

The two guidelines outline legal obligations under the EO Act in relation to sport and work, as well as practical information about gender identity issues, including lists of useful terms, case studies and decision-making steps.  While not legally binding, a court or tribunal may consider whether the guidelines have been complied with when hearing a discrimination complaint.

Discrimination on the basis of gender identity

The EO Act protects transgender and intersex people from both direct and indirect discrimination on the basis of their gender identity (ss 6(d) and 7).  Direct discrimination occurs when a person is treated, or proposed to be treated, unfavourably because of their gender identity (s 8(1)).  Indirect discrimination occurs when an unreasonable requirement, condition or practice is imposed, or proposed to be imposed, which has, or is likely to have, the effect of disadvantaging a person with a particular gender identity (s 9(1)).

It is also unlawful to ask a person to specify their gender identity where there is no legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for needing this information (s 107).

'Gender identity' is defined in s 4 of the EO Act as the identification by a person of one sex (or of indeterminate sex) as a member of another sex on a genuine basis.  This identification could be by:

• assuming characteristics of the other sex, whether by medical intervention, style of dressing or otherwise; or
• by the person living, or seeking to live, as a member of the other sex. 

The rights of transgender and intersex people are also protected under the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006.

Transgender people and sport

This guideline is aimed at sporting organisations, clubs and staff.  It will also be useful for schools and universities.  The guideline explains that it is unlawful to discriminate against a person on the basis of their gender identity by failing to select them or excluding them from participating in sporting teams and activities, unless a relevant exception applies (s 71).  It also explains that it is against the law to discriminate against a person on the basis of their gender identity in club membership, including sporting clubs (ss 64 and 65), although it may be lawful for clubs to limit membership to a particular sex (s 68).

Transgender people at work

This guideline is aimed at all employers, and is relevant to all government departments and public entities.  VEOHRC has also produced resources for developing a transition plan for transgender employees as well as a policy template.  These documents will be useful for human resources professionals and anyone with responsibility for interviewing or recruiting new employees.

The guideline explains that it is unlawful to discriminate against job applicants and employees because they are transgender (ss 16 and 18).  The only exception is if there is a 'genuine occupational requirement' for employees to be of a particular sex (s 26).

If you are in the Victorian Government and would like further information about your responsibilities under the Equal Opportunity Act 2010, please contact:

Catherine Roberts
Managing Principal Solicitor
8684 0247
catherine.roberts@vgso.vic.gov.au

David Catanese
Principal Solicitor
9032 3040
david.catanese@vgso.vic.gov.au

Changing Times: Sex discrimination damages on the rise as the 'old range' debunked by 'community standards'

The Full Court of the Federal Court has blown the lid off what key commentators have been calling the discrimination damages time capsule. In Richardson v Oracle an award at trial of $18,000 for pain and suffering caused by sexual harassment at IT company, Oracle, was increased to $100,000 on appeal. The decision has some lawyers quoting Bob Dylan's 'the time's they are a-changin'. So, what happened, and why the revolutionary tenor?

The Full Court did two main things - both are critical for public sector employers who could be liable for unlawful conduct by their employees.

1. 'Unofficial range' rejected

Justice Kenny (with whom Besanko and Perram JJ agreed) held that the $18,000 awarded by the trial Judge was 'manifestly inadequate' compensation for Ms Richardson's pain and suffering. In doing so, the Court rejected a long-standing unofficial range of between $12,000 and $20,000 within which damages for all but the most extreme sexual harassment injuries have previously been awarded.

While her Honour accepted that the trial Judge fixed a sum squarely 'within the range', this was not, as her Honour put it, 'the end of the matter'. The Court identified a 'substantial disparity' between Ms Richardson's compensation and the amounts now awarded outside the sex discrimination space to victims of workplace bullying and harassment (especially in Victoria). After highlighting the dangers of relying too heavily on an unofficial range at all, the Court rejected it. The range had, her Honour stated, 'remained unchanged' for over a decade 'notwithstanding that the community has generally gained a deeper appreciation of the experience of hurt and humiliation that victims of sexual harassment experience'.

Once the range was cast aside, the Court assessed Ms Richardson's loss by reference to 'general standards prevailing in the community' regarding the value of her pain and suffering: In this case, the amount was determined to be $100,000.

2. Damages awarded for Ms Richardson's 'choice to leave'

Perram and Besanko JJ (with whom Kenny J agreed) also overturned the trial Judge's finding that Oracle was not liable for Ms Richardson's financial loss upon leaving the company. Although she was not constructively dismissed or demoted, Oracle was still liable for Ms Richardson's loss. The clincher here was causation. Even though Oracle had not 'forced her out', it was liable once she 'chose' to leave because this 'choice' was itself caused by the sexual harassment. Such an analysis is not entirely new, but in Richardson the Court applied these principles to what may be a very common series of events where sexual harassment is proven.

TAKE HOME POINTS

So what does this mean for the public sector? In short, it seems the times are a changin'.

This decision confirms that, as always, employers must take sexual harassment in the workplace seriously. A failure to do so can now amount to higher damages than traditionally awarded against employers who are held to be vicariously liable for an employee's discriminatory conduct. The impact of the sexual harassment in this case, although significant, was not considered to be traumatic. Nevertheless, Ms Richardson was awarded $100,000 in recognition that 'community standards' and expectation have altered.

It is also important to bear in mind that these principles could be applied more generally in cases involving unlawful discrimination on the basis of other attributes, such as disability, race or age discrimination. The decision, therefore, has significant implications beyond cases involving sexual harassment.

Richardson is a timely reminder to review your agency's anti-discrimination policies and provide appropriate training to ensure that all employees are aware of the law and their obligations under it.
For further information about the case, advice on your agency’s anti-discrimination policies or how to keep up with the law involving anti- discrimination, please contact:

Vicki Moulatsiotis
Principal Solicitor
t 9032 3012
vicki.moulatsiotis@vgso.vic.gov.au

Katherine Francis
Senior Solicitor
t 9032 3014
katherine.francis@vgso.vic.gov.au

Hollie Kerwin
Solicitor
t 8684 0241
hollie.kerwin@vgso.vic.gov.au

Sweet child o’ mine

Birth registration is important. It is the first step in the process of formal recognition of an individual by the state. But for some in the community, the process of registering a birth is difficult (and not just because filling out a three page form is tough for anyone on two hours sleep per night).

Whilst getting bubs to sleep is beyond the State Government’s control, it recently asked the Victorian Law Reform Commission to look into the process for birth registration.

The Commission heard from different sections of the community about their experiences of obtaining a birth certificate, including some adults whose birth was never registered. It examined whether the current process makes getting a certificate difficult, particularly for already marginalised groups.

The Commission handed down its report in November.

The report identified reasons for failing to register a birth or apply for a certificate, including:

• a lack of awareness of the requirement to register;
• a poor understanding of the importance of registration;
• the cost of obtaining a birth certificate; and
• other issues such as mental illness or family violence concerns.

In short, disadvantaged background is a common theme for late registration or non-registration of a birth.

The Commission made 26 recommendations, 23 of which relate to changes in procedure at the Births Deaths and Marriages Registry.

The recommendations include:

• Changing the way in which the particulars of birth notification are collected and how, and by whom, a birth can be registered.
• Changing procedure where family violence may be a barrier to the registration of a birth.
• Better facilitation of the birth registration process and access to birth certificates for cross-border Indigenous communities.
• Streamlining birth registration with applications for services by the Commonwealth.
• Broadening who may certify identity documents as well as the type of proof of identity documents the Registrar will accept to support an application.
• Clarifying the fee exemption policy.

Whilst the recommendations relate to the birth registration and birth certificate application process, the report is useful reading for any government officer designing a policy that balances the need for consistency (or certainty of public records) with the flexibility to ensure that a program can actually work across diverse groups in society.

Flexibility is a fundamental aspect of good government decision-making. Where there is discretion in a decision-making process, there should be a policy to ensure decisions are made consistently and fairly. But that policy must be sufficiently flexible to cover a range of circumstances. This report by the VLRC provides a good concrete example of how an agency can tailor its policies and guidelines to achieve flexibility without compromising on certainty or consistency in program implementation.

For more information about this report, designing flexible decision-making policies or working Gunners references into your professional writing, please contact:

Elsie Loh
Principal Solicitor
t 8684 0144 
elsie.loh@vgso.vic.gov.au

Managing serial complainants

Managing serial complainants is a challenge for all public administrators. Dealing with these complainants is resource and time intensive and can pose difficulties if a particular complainant is aggressive or abusive towards staff.

Administrators need to take care in the strategies they adopt to deal with complainants, especially if complainants' behaviour is symptomatic of any underlying disability.

In the recent VCAT decision of Slattery v Manningham City Council, a complainant successfully claimed that the Manningham City Council (Council) had directly discriminated against him on the ground of disability in banning him from all Council buildings, breaching s 44 of the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (EO Act).

The case is significant because it is one of the first decisions to consider how the test for direct discrimination operates under the EO Act.

Since 1998, Mr Slattery had made thousands of written and verbal complaints to the Council in relation to matters Mr Slattery had identified as 'safety issues'. Many of Mr Slattery's complaints were derogatory or offensive towards Councillors or Council staff. Over a fifteen year period, there were a handful of physical altercations between Mr Slattery and Council staff members. Council estimated that it spent approximately $10,000 per year dealing with Mr Slattery's complaints. In April 2009, the Council imposed the ban on Mr Slattery.

Mr Slattery had a number of diagnosed disabilities, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), bipolar disorder and a brain injury following a stroke, however has not received treatment for any of these conditions for a number of years. Council had, at one stage, engaged the assistance of a psychiatrist, to formulate strategies for dealing with Mr Slattery.

Senior Member Nihill first considered what constituted unfavourable treatment within the definition of direct discrimination, and whether it was necessary to carry out a comparative analysis to determine if a person has been treated unfavourably because of a protected attribute (in this case, a disability).

SM Nihill's starting point was the Court of Appeal's decision in Aitken v State of Victoria, where the Court of Appeal accepted that the question as to whether a comparative analysis is required under the EO Act remains an unresolved question of law in Victoria.

Following a discussion of helpful case law, interpretation legislation and extrinsic material, SM Nihill concluded that the definition of direct discrimination in the EO Act does not require a comparator (a conclusion also reached in the recent VCAT decision on Victoria Police's beard policy). Rather, what is required is an analysis of the impact of treatment on the person complaining of it. This analysis may be informed by the treatment afforded to others, however, such a consideration is not required under section 8 of the EO Act.

SM Nihill formed the view that Council's maintenance of the ban, preventing Mr Slattery from accessing services in any building owned, occupied or managed by Council, particularly after Mr Slattery requested that the ban be lifted in November 2012, constituted unfavourable treatment.

SM Nihill next went on to consider whether the unfavourable treatment of Mr Slattery was because he had a protected attribute.

The Tribunal heard psychiatric evidence from Dr Farnbach, who had been Mr Slattery's treating psychiatrist. Dr Farnbach gave evidence that as a result of his PTSD and impulse control disorder, Mr Slattery experienced a strong and urgent compulsion to make reports to Council, particularly about public safety and about 'people doing the right thing'. After reports were made, Mr Slattery would experience relief.

SM Nihill concluded, on the basis of Dr Farnbach's evidence that Mr Slattery's tendency to complain compulsively is a symptom of his disabilities, and therefore fell within the definition of disability contained in s 4 of the EO Act.

Given, that Mr Slattery's behaviour in compulsively complaining to the Council, was a result of his disability, and that one of the reasons that Council had imposed the ban was to 'manage' Mr Slattery, SM Nihill concluded that Mr Slattery's disability was a substantial reason for the Council's unfavourable treatment of Mr Slattery, and therefore that Mr Slattery had been the subject of direct discrimination by the Council.

The Council was unsuccessful in arguing that an exception under ss 75 or 86 of the EO Act applied (that is, that it was necessary to impose the ban on Mr Slattery to protect the health and safety of Councillors, Council staff and the wider public).

The question of remedies was left to be discussed by the parties in a compulsory conference.

If you are in the Victorian Government and would like advice on the EO Act or this case, please contact:

Penina Berkovic
Principal Solicitor
t 8684 0226
penina.berkovic@vgso.vic.gov.au

Bruce Chen
Senior Solicitor
t 8684 0425
bruce.chen@vgso.vic.gov.au