Director of Public Prosecutions publishes new policy

In August 2017, the Director of Public Prosecutions published the Policy of the Director of Public Prosecutions for Victoria (Policy).  The Policy follows a comprehensive review of the DPP's policy material and replaces all former DPP policies.

The Policy is required reading for anyone involved in prosecution or employed in an agency with prosecutorial or regulatory functions.  You can and should use the Policy to guide your prosecutorial decisions in line with modern prosecutorial principles.  We've produced a quick summary of what the policy covers to help you easily identify the areas you might find most relevant to your day to day functions.

What does the Policy cover?

The Policy supplements the Public Prosecutions Act 1994 and relevant case law to promote  transparency, accountability and consistency in prosecutorial decision-making.  It aims to reflect, accurately and succinctly, the needs of modern-day prosecutors.  Importantly, the overriding criteria in making the decision to prosecute remain that there is a reasonable prospect of a conviction and the prosecution is in the public interest.

In summary, the Policy covers:

• prosecutorial discretion 
• the role of the prosecutor
• victims and persons adversely affected by crime
• resolution of criminal proceedings by agreement between the prosecution and the accused
• the appropriate jurisdiction for indictable offences triable summarily
• undertakings and indemnities
• juries
• family violence
• appeals, references, retrials and reinvestigations
• takeover of prosecutions by the DPP
• proceeds of crime
• giving reasons for prosecutorial decisions
• advice from the Office of Public Prosecutions to external agencies
• detention orders under the Serious Sex Offenders (Detention and Supervisions) Act 2009.

The DPP has also said that he will not print the Policy for distribution, but will treat it as a living, electronic document, to be continually reviewed and accessed as needed.  This approach ensures that the Policy is consistently relevant and up-to-date.  You can follow the DPP on Twitter to receive notification of updates to the policy.

What doesn't the Policy cover?

Inevitably, some matters covered by former policies are not covered in the Policy.  After all, the single, 50-page Policy replaces over 50 former policies, issued over several years and totalling almost 500 pages.  In the Policy Foreword, the DPP notes that this series of former policies did not bear a sufficient connection to the practice of a modern-day prosecutor.  Generally speaking, the Victorian public prosecutions service has sought to excise any policy material that was out of date, was related to internal DPP procedures or was seen as an unnecessary recitation of the law.

To give just a few examples, the new Policy does not reproduce the former policies on media communication, the investigation of jury offences or protocols for the prosecution of joint State-Commonwealth matters.  Several policies relating to specific applications or pieces of legislation have also been retired, such as those on notifications under s 49(1) of the Coroners Act 2008, the granting of consent to prosecute under the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 and the granting of consent to extend time to prosecute under the Funerals Act 2006.

What else does the Policy mean for me?

Agencies with prosecutorial or regulatory functions may also wish to review their internal policies and manuals to ensure they are up-to-date.  VGSO have a team of regulatory and enforcement specialists who can assist with investigations, prosecutions, as well as drafting of relevant policies, manuals and staff training.

Where can I go for more information?

If you would like further advice about the Policy or its implications for your practice, please contact:

Alicia Robson
8684 0494
Acting Managing Principal Solicitor

Michael Rancie
8684 0266
Solicitor

No longer in the shadowlands: regulation of unregistered health service providers

As of 1 February 2017, Victoria has a new health complaints system with the commencement of the Health Complaints Act 2016 (Act) and the appointment of the inaugural Victorian Health Complaints Commissioner, Karen Cusack. This new role replaces the former Health Services Commissioner.

It has been almost 30 years since the Victorian health complaints scheme was designed. In this time, the number and diversity of health services available have increased significantly.

Media reports over a number of years have highlighted the stories of vulnerable and unwell people, who have obtained health services from unregistered health service providers based on what they later realised were false or misleading claims about the efficacy of the treatment. In a number of cases, the treatment received has been experimental, costly, and provided to the potential detriment of the patient’s health in cases where other treatment options have been ignored or discouraged.

Previously, there was only limited recourse under consumer protection and trade practices legislation in situations where a person complained about an unregistered health service provider.

The new Act seeks to address the previous ‘shadowlands’ of unregistered health providers to better protect members of the public from receiving unsafe or non-efficacious health services.

Many providers of, what are often described as, 'alternative' or 'non-mainstream' health services are not subject to professional registration and, therefore, lie beyond the regulation of the 14 health profession boards and the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency (AHPRA). The Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Victoria) Act 2009 is also not directed at preventing a registered health practitioner from providing unsafe, non-efficacious or unethical health services where such treatment is outside the scope of their professional registration.

The Act applies to all providers of a 'health service'. This term is defined broadly in the Act and focuses on the purpose of the activity. For example, any activity intended or claimed to 'assess, predict, maintain or improve [a] person's physical, mental or psychological health or status', as well as therapeutic counselling services. Importantly, the Act introduces a Code of Conduct that sets standards for the provision of safe and ethical health services.

The Act seeks to promote the efficient and effective management of complaints with a focus on conciliation. However, where a complaint cannot be resolved, the Act provides the Commissioner with significant powers to investigate complaints and take action against unsafe or unethical health service providers.

Powers of the Health Complaints Commissioner

The Health Complaints Commissioner has power under the Act to:

• investigate complaints about the provision of 'health services', including by:
• unregistered practitioners
• registered practitioners providing health services outside the scope of their professional registration
• formerly registered practitioners
• conduct own motion investigations where no specific complaint has been received
• accept complaints from affected individuals and third parties, including carers, health practitioners or other healthcare providers
• make prohibition orders to prevent unsafe or unethical services or products 
• enter and search premises, order the production of documents, and call persons to give evidence at an investigation hearing before the Commissioner 
• set penalties for failing to comply with investigation hearing notices and interim prohibition orders of the Commissioner (including up to two years' imprisonment)
• ban unregulated healthcare providers from providing health services in Victoria where they are prohibited from practising in other states
• publish public health warnings and publicly name providers

The new Health Complaints Act is a welcome step to fill the regulatory gap that existed between unregistered healthcare providers and registered health practitioners to ensure better protection for the health and wellbeing of the public.

Links
Health Complaints Commissioner
Code of conduct

Joanne Kummrow
Special Counsel
03 8684 0462

Andrew Field
Managing Principal Solicitor
03 8684 0889

Michele Rowland
Principal Solicitor
03 8684 0413

This blog was prepared with the assistance of Mary Quinn, Solicitor, and Milli Allan, Trainee Lawyer.

Regulators and decision-makers, it's a dog's life

The recent High Court decision in Isbester v Knox City Council [2015] HCA 20 reinforces to regulators that their staff cannot act as jury, judge and executioner, and they must apply the principles of natural justice to each decision, acting without any perception of bias.

On 10 June 2015, the High Court in essence held that the same staff within a regulator cannot be involved in the prosecution of a criminal charge then sit on a review panel for a related matter, even if not acting as the final decision-maker, due to the perception of bias.

Facts of case

Ms Hughes was a Council employee who, as an authorised officer, charged Ms Isbester with an offence under s 29 of the Domestic Animals Act 1994 (Vic) relating to an attack by her dog.

Later, Ms Hughes sat as a member of a three-person panel which deliberated and recommended to the chairperson of that panel, who was the ultimate decision maker, that he make an order to destroy the dog under s 84P(e) of the same Act.

The High Court considered the question of whether there was a possibility that Ms Hughes could have prejudged the decision to destroy the dog after her involvement in the prosecution of the charges against Ms Isbester, and whether that could give rise to an apprehension of a conflict of interest.

Principles of bias

The well-known principle governing cases of possible bias was said in Ebner[1] to require two steps:

1.         An interest which might lead a decision-maker to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits.

2.           A logical connection between that interest and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits.

Ms Isbester had alleged that:

(a)          Ms Hughes had such an 'interest' as a person bringing charges, whether as a prosecutor or other accuser, in the outcome of the hearing of those charges; and

(b)          This interest would conflict with the objectivity required of Ms Hughes as a member of another decision‑making body deciding the consequential matter of whether to destroy the dog.

Joint judgment

In their joint judgment, the Honourable Justices Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle held at [42] that:

It is not realistic to view Ms Hughes' interest in the matter as coming to an end when the proceedings in the Magistrates' Court were completed.  A line cannot be drawn at that point of her involvement so as to quarantine the Magistrates' Court proceedings from her actions as a member of the Panel.  It is reasonably to be expected that her involvement in the prosecution of the charges created an interest in the final outcome of the matter.

Of course, the "final outcome of the matter" was the decision of whether to destroy the dog.

Their Honours held at [43] that:

Having participated in obtaining the conviction for the offence under s 29(4), [Ms Hughes] organised the Panel hearing and drafted the letter advising [Ms Isbester] of it.  She supplied the Panel with evidence, including further evidence she had obtained as relevant to the future housing of the dog.  If Ms Hughes could not actually be described as a prosecutor with respect to the decision under s 84P(e), she was certainly the moving force.

A fair-minded observer might reasonably apprehend that Ms Hughes might not have brought an impartial mind to the decision under s 84P(e).

Their Honours confirmed that this was the case even though the primary judge had found that Ms Hughes had acted nothing other than diligently, and in accordance with her duties, or that she was in fact wholly impartial.  They said that "natural justice required, however, that she not participate in the decision and because that occurred, the decision must be quashed."

So, the decision to destroy the dog was set aside.  As they say, every dog has it's day...

Victorian Government clients seeking advice on investigations and the prosecution of criminal charges, can contact:

Jennifer Butler

Principal Solicitor

8684 0423

Greg Elms

Managing Principal Solicitor

8684 0414

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[1] Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy; Clenae Pty Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2000) 205 CLR 337

Striking a balance for the thin blue line: The new torts regime for Victoria Police

The current law

The current law in Victoria founded in s 123 of the Police Regulation Act 1958 states that sworn police members are provided statutory immunity by the State of Victoria (the State) in civil claims where the conduct or omitted conduct is in the course of their duties, and the conduct is reasonably or necessarily done and they have acted in good faith.  Generally, this means that if this statutory immunity is provided and a plaintiff is successful in bringing a legal proceeding in tort against police members that liability and an award of damages is transferred and paid by the State.

The intent of the current law is to give those adversely affected by police behaviour in torts a right of recourse against the State for police members’ wrongs.  However, there are numerous pitfalls with the scheme. One of these is the lack of certainty for claimants, especially those who bring successful claims against individual police members but then struggle to recover damages and have no recourse to obtain money from the State because the members are deemed not to have acted reasonably, necessarily or in good faith.

The current regime has also given rise to a multitude of practical problems, such as:

• the requirement to engage separate legal representation to represent the interests of the State and police members named as defendants in a civil claim;
• significant legal expenses incurred in cases involving split legal representation; and
• difficulties in coordinating and managing claims involving split legal representation. 

The new law

A new legislative scheme under the Victoria Police Act 2013 ( the Act) will soon come into force to overcome the pitfalls with the current scheme. A key aim of the new scheme is to provide people with a level of certainty that the State will be liable if their legal claim against Victoria Police is successful.

Essentially, the new Act provides that a person can bring a police tort claim against the State where a police member or protective services officer (PSO) has allegedly committed a tort in the performance (or purported performance) of their duties.  A 'police tort claim' in the Act includes claims in negligence, assault and battery, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, as well as detrimental action claims and certain wrongful death actions.

Under the Act, a person is not permitted to make a claim against a police member or PSO personally unless the State denies liability by arguing that an individual member or PSO engaged in 'serious and wilful misconduct'. This aims to protect police members and PSOs that have acted in good faith in the course of their duties from being personally named in court proceedings.

However, if a police member or PSO has engaged in particularly egregious conduct the State can raise the defence of 'serious and wilful misconduct' to defeat the claim. If the State raises this defence, the individual police members or PSOs will be required to be named as individual defendants to the proceeding and these individuals will be required to pay any damages ordered by the court if they are found liable in the proceeding and have also been found to have acted with 'serious and wilful misconduct'.

The meaning of 'serious and wilful misconduct'

The term 'serious and wilful misconduct' is not defined in the Act and has not yet been considered by Victorian courts in the context of policing.  However, guidance can be taken from the Victorian Government, which stated the following in the Second Reading Speech for the Act:

'this means that serious misconduct by police which is deliberate, which extends beyond recklessness, or culpable or gross negligence and which is done with a knowledge that risk of injury or loss may occur, may fall within the concept of serious and wilful misconduct'.

In other jurisdictions, examples of what courts have found to constitute 'serious and wilful misconduct' by police members include:

• falsely imprisoning a suspect, forcing a confession using threats and maliciously prosecuting the suspect based on this confession;
• lying to a police oversight body and not acting on disciplinary files;
• committing multiple acts of larceny; and 
• extorting $10,000 from an alleged child pornographer and making threats to otherwise pursue child pornography charges.

Under the Act, if the State succeeds with its defence of 'serious and wilful misconduct', the State has no right to seek costs against the person bringing the claim. However, the State must pay any damages or costs awarded to a claimant against a police member or PSO, if the Minister is satisfied that the successful claimant is unlikely to recover the money from the police member (or PSO) and has exhausted all avenues to recover the amount.

Time for change

What impact the new regime will have on claimants and Victoria Police remains to be seen. However, as legal representatives for Victoria Police, the VGSO welcomes these legislative changes which will hopefully provide certainty for successful claimants, less stress for members involved in civil litigation, less public monies spent on legal fees and  increased efficiency in the civil litigation process.

If you are in the Victorian Government and would like advice on the new torts regime for Victoria Police, please contact:

Louise Jarrett
louise.jarrett@vgso.vic.gov.au
9247 6798

Monika Pekevska
monika.pekevska@vgso.vic.gov.au
8684 0467

James Hird and the future of procedural fairness by private bodies

Though footy may rule Melbourne, the AFL is not part of government.*  So why did James Hird allege that the AFL should have accorded him procedural fairness – an administrative law doctrine – in determining whether he breached the AFL Rules?

Procedural fairness (also known as natural justice) forms part of administrative law, being the body of law that describes how governments must behave.  It is one of the grounds for which an aggrieved party can ask the Supreme Court to review a government decision.  There is a common law presumption that procedural fairness applies to decisions made under statute that affect rights and interests.  But procedural fairness can also apply to private bodies that make decisions affecting rights and interests, such as disciplinary decisions, where such decisions are of a ‘public’ character.

Government lawyers regularly contract with such bodies or provide them with policy guidance, so we thought we'd recap the various ways in which private bodies can be required to accord procedural fairness in their decision making.

The precise steps a private body must take to fulfill its procedural fairness obligations depend, of course, on the relevant facts and circumstances, a topic beyond the scope of this post. Give one of our lawyers a call if you need specific advice on what is required for a particular decision.

Decisions of clubs and societies

The Court may step in to protect due process in decisions made under the rules of trade unions, political parties, racing stewards, sporting associations and professional bodies where financial interests or reputation are at stake, even where the decision-maker is not given powers under statute.  However, this is usually not a judicial review action, but an action for breach of contract, or for unreasonable restraint of trade.

The requirements of procedural fairness can differ for these non-statutory bodies. It depends on their rules and may depend on the decision at hand.  Where a Court determines that procedural fairness would apply to a decision of a club or society, the minimum procedural fairness obligation would include that:

• A person accused should know the nature of any accusation made against him or her;
• The person should be given an opportunity to state his or her case;
• The tribunal should act in good faith.
• The person must have a proper hearing, with access to all evidence against him or her.

When parliament has created a separate requirement that the body must provide procedural fairness

Parliament can create a requirement that a private body must provide procedural fairness if it is to be registered with government, such as s 4.3.1 of the Education and Training Reform Act 2006 for private schools or s 88 of the Cooperatives Act 1996 for co-operatives. This does not provide a basis for judicial review.  However, for example, a parent of a private school student could ask the VRQA to withdraw a private school's registration if it failed to afford procedural fairness to a student.

When a contract between a private body and an individual requires procedural fairness

This will provide the individual with a contractual remedy if procedural fairness is not accorded.  However, it will probably not provide a judicial review remedy, even if the private body was empowered to enter into a contract by a statute. 

What about when governments transfer decision-making responsibilities to outside bodies?

The million dollar question. In Australia the law is unsettled but it looks ripe for growth.

The High Court's 2003 decision of NEAT Domestic Trading found that judicial review will not cover private bodies making decisions simply because the decisions are given force by an enactment.  It will depend on the particular legislation. 

NEAT was a wheat grower who sought permission to export wheat. Under the Wheat Marketing Act 1989, bulk export of wheat was unlawful without the consent of the Wheat Export Authority. The WEA could not give its consent without the approval of a corporation owned by wheat growers, AWB International Ltd.  A 3:2 majority of the High Court found that AWBI's decision to withhold its approval was not a judicially reviewable decision because its capacity to provide an approval was not conferred by the Act but from the companies legislation under which it was incorporated.  This was so even though AWBI's approval was a condition precedent to the WEA consenting under the Act. 

But the case had strong dissents from Gleeson CJ and Kirby J.  And since then, the High Court and the Victorian courts have made noises suggesting judicial review remedies (and thus procedural fairness obligations) follow when governments outsource decision-making…

In the unanimous 2011 decision M61, the High Court found that external contractors making decisions under the Migration Act 1958 were obliged to afford procedural fairness.  This was because the contractors were taking steps under the Act, and because their inquiries had a direct impact on the rights and interests of the plaintiffs, being asylum seekers whose detention was prolonged as a result of the contractors’ inquiries.

In Victoria, there is a growing body of judicial support for the Datafin principle – the idea (from a 1987 English Court of Appeal case) that a decision of a private body may be amenable to judicial review if the decision is made in the performance of a ‘public duty’ or in the exercise of a power which has a ‘public element’. This principle extends judicial review to government decision-makers who act under non-statutory powers and to private regulatory bodies whose functions have a sufficiently public effect.

The two minority judges in NEAT appeared receptive to the logic of the principle, and thus its position in Australia remains unsettled until tackled by the High Court.

But it has some fans in Victoria, Justice Kyrou observing in 2010 that:

the Datafin principle represents a natural development in the evolution of the principles of judicial review. Indeed, it is a necessary development to ensure that the principles can adapt to modern government practices. 

And last year, the Court of Appeal described the principle as ‘appealing’ and ‘logical’ in light of the ‘increasing privatisation of governmental functions in Australia.

Masu Financial Management v Financial Industry Complaints Service No 2 is an example of the types of bodies and decisions that could be caught by the Datafin logic.  In that decision, Shaw J held that a decision of the FICS was amenable to judicial review because it exercised powers of a public nature.  FICS was a private incorporated body responsible for administering a complaints resolution scheme.  It was established by the financial services industry and was not based in statute.

So we think the expansion of procedural fairness obligations to private bodies will be a hot issue in the near future. And not just because plaintiffs want to hang out with the likes of Hirdy in the Supreme Court foyer.

* it may have some quasi-religious status, but that’s another post for another day…

If you are in the Victorian government and need guidance on procedural fairness obligations, please contact:

Penina Berkovic
Principal Solicitor
t 8684 0226
penina.berkovic@vgso.vic.gov.au

When is it OK for a public servant to tweet political opinions?

Are you a public servant who uses social media to express political views?  A recent Federal Circuit Court decision involving a pseudonymous Twitter account has once again highlighted the importance for public servants to 'look before you leap' into social media and for Departments to provide clear guidance about political comments by public servants, whether on social media or in other public fora.

The decision

The decision is Banerji v Department of Immigration and it raises more questions than it answers.  Being a Federal Circuit Court decision, it is not binding on State courts or the State Government.  Furthermore, the Court was deciding an application for an injunction and the decision is not a final determination of the limits of a public servant's freedom to engage in social media.  However, the circumstances of a public servant tweeting critical comments about her employer are probably not unique to the federal sphere and it is likely that a Victorian court would consider the case if a similar issue arose with Victorian public servants.  It is therefore a timely reminder to revisit the difficult issue of what kind of online political discussions Victorian public servants may legitimately engage in.

Michaela Banerji works for the Department of Immigration.  She has a Twitter account under the pseudonym @LaLegale.  She used this account to criticise the immigration policies of the Federal Government, the conditions in detention centres and comments made on these issues by various Ministers and government employees.

Ms Banerji claimed the tweets were a ‘simple expression of political opinion, made in her own time away from work’.  The Department claimed that the tweets breached:

• her contract of employment;
• the Department’s Social Media Guidelines; and
• the Australian Public Service’s Code of Conduct.

Judge Neville declined to issue an injunction preventing Ms Banerji’s dismissal on the basis that the application for an injunction was premature, as the internal departmental processes had not yet been finalised. 

Twitter and the implied freedom of political communication

In doing so, his Honour made some brief comments about Ms Banerji's Twitter use, and whether the implied constitutional right of freedom of expression protects it, which set the Twittersphere alight and gave many a public servant pause for thought before pressing 'retweet'.

An implied right to freedom of political communication exists in our Constitution, limiting federal or State ‘laws’, be they exercises of legislative or executive power.  Free communication on matters of government and politics is necessary for the system of representative and responsible government established by s 7 and s 24 of the Constitution, the High Court unanimously reasoned in the 1997 case Lange.  The freedom is not absolute but if limitations are to be imposed on it, those limitations must be ‘reasonably appropriate and adapted’ to maintaining the system of government prescribed by the Constitution.

As his Honour was deciding whether to grant an injunction, Judge Neville did not need to consider whether dismissal of Ms Banerji would be reasonable.  His Honour simply found, without explanation, that the implied freedom did not provide ‘a license… to breach a contract of employment’.

This is an interesting finding. Entry into contracts is a textbook example of an exercise of executive power.  And the implied freedom of political communication can curtail executive power.  This is settled law, even though the only aspect of executive power that has been litigated for infringing the freedom is the exercise of delegated legislative power.

Perhaps some contracts lack a sufficient connection with a ‘law’ to fit within the Lange test.  But Commonwealth public servant employment contracts are so intertwined with Public Service Act 1999 that it is surely arguable that the disciplinary provisions within this Act must be interpreted in line with the freedom.  A discussion for a later judgment, perhaps?

In the meantime, there are only questions and a degree of angst about acceptable online behavior for public servants.  When is tweeting a political opinion OK?  Is there a difference between pseudonymous accounts and accounts that identify the public servant?  What if Ms Banerji had worked for the Department of Treasury while criticising the Department of Immigration?  Perhaps it was the way in which Ms Banerji expressed her tweets, which were described as 'sometimes mocking, sometimes critical'?  Would it have been OK if Ms Banerji had a sufficient disclaimer in her bio? If she was praising her Department rather than criticising? If she was simply re-tweeting the views of others?

How would Ms Banerji have fared if she were a Victorian public servant?

Victorian public servants are bound by the Code of Conduct for Victorian Public Sector Employees (No 1) 2007, the Public Service Standards Commissioner’s ‘Guidance for use of social media in the Victorian public sector’ and individual Departmental policies, such as the Department of Justice’s Social Media Policy.

Clause 2.2 of the Code requires public servants to ‘conduct themselves in an apolitical manner' and to avoid 'in the course of their work, any participation in activities which support a political party or independent candidates including attendance at fund raising or similar events’.  Whilst Ms Banerji was expressing political views, she claimed not to be doing so in the course of her employment - although it is interesting to note that Ms Banerji is a 'public affairs officer' responsible for communicating the Department's message.  Ms Banerji's tweets were not in support of a political party or candidate.

Clause 3.5 of the Code states: ‘When making a comment in a private capacity, public sector employees ensure their comments are not related to any government activity that they are involved in or connected with as a public sector employee and make it clear they are expressing their own view. They ensure personal comments do not compromise their capacity to perform their public sector role in an unbiased manner’.  Ms Banerji was tweeting on matters relating to government activity with which she was connected.  But did her views prevent her carrying out her role without bias?

The Department of Justice policy that public servants should not ‘make any comment or post any material that might otherwise cause damage to the department's reputation or bring it into disrepute’ is stated to apply only ‘[w]here your comments or profile can identify you as a public servant’. 

The issue of how much political discussion is too much for a public servant has always been a difficult one, with clues to the answer lying in the Constitution Act 1975, the Public Administration Act 2004, the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, the VPS Code of Conduct and Departmental policy.  The issue is not a new one, but social media has made it more visible.

While the answers remain elusive, Victorian public servants engaging in online or offline political discussion would be wise to read and regularly re-read the VPS Code of Conduct and their Department's policies and to 'think before you tweet'.  Victorian departments and agencies should also regularly review their social media and other policies to check whether they are providing useful and specific guidance on how their employees may participate in political discussions in their private lives.

For advice on social media use by Government and public servants, please poke:

Katie Miller
Principal Solicitor
t  8684 0460 
katie.miller@vgso.vic.gov.au