A question of time: calculating statutory time limits

Statutory time limits for taking action are described in different ways within legislation, making (what should be) simple maths complicated for lawyers and decision-makers.

The Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (VCAT Act) includes the following two examples of statutory time limits:

• a Ministerial call-in notice is of no effect unless it is given no later than 7 days before the day fixed for the hearing of the proceeding (cl 58(2), Sch 1, VCAT Act);
• a request to a decision-maker for a statement of reasons must be made in writing within 28 days after the day on which the decision was made (s 45, VCAT Act).

These examples alone could cause confusion. Does 'no later than seven days' mean one week, or more than a week? Does 'within 28 days' include the 28th day? What if the final date falls on a weekend?

The laws on statutory time limits

Luckily, we do have some guidance on how to count these time periods. Section 44 of the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (IL Act) sets out rules for counting days under Victorian legislation. For example:

• If a time limit for 'doing' something falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a public holiday, the time limit should extend to the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday or a public holiday. This is sometimes called the 'extension rule'; 
• If a period of time ends on a specific day, that day is included in the period;
• If a period begins on a specific day, that day is not included in the period.

Waterfront Place Pty Ltd v Minister for Planning [2019] VSCA 156 

Section 44 of the IL Act was directly at issue in the recent Supreme Court of Appeal decision of Waterfront Place Pty Ltd v Minister for Planning [2019] VSCA 156.

The facts

The Applicant (Waterfront) owns land in Port Melbourne. On 24 October 2016, Waterfront applied to Port Phillip City Council (Council) for a planning permit to develop its land for the purpose of a 10 storey development.  The application was refused. On 12 September 2017, Waterfront commenced proceedings in the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal) to review the Council's decision.

The Minister for Planning (the Minister) 'called in' (i.e. 'intervened in') the proceeding, pursuant to the power under cl 58(2) of Schedule 1 of the VCAT Act.

To be valid, a call in notice must be submitted no later than 7 days before the date of the hearing. In this case:

• the hearing was listed on Monday, 30 July 2018; and
• the Minister called in the proceeding on Monday 23 July 2018.

The issue was whether the call in notice was submitted in time. The Court of Appeal held that it was, and so the Ministerial call in was valid.

The Court reasoned as follows:

• as a first step, 'no later than 7 days before' Monday 30 July 2018 meant that the last date for the call in notice to be filed was Sunday 22 July 2018 (all parties agreed with this first proposition);
• under s 44 of the IL Act, Sunday is a 'holiday' and, applying the extension rule, if the last day for doing something falls on a holiday, the time extends to the following day;
• therefore, the last day that the Minister was permitted to call in the proceeding was Monday 23 July 2018.

The Court rejected Waterfront's arguments that the extension rule in the IL Act did not apply to the statutory time frame in this case, due to the phrase 'no later than' and the adverse impacts on the Tribunal and the parties arising from a 'late' call in notice. In particular, the Court emphasised that the extension rule should be the 'general rule', and, because it is a rule of 'practical common sense', it should only be displaced where the legislation expressly intends for it to be displaced. The Court found there was no such express intention in this case.

Key takeaways

The decision is a reminder that calculating statutory time frames can be more complicated than you might think. There will be rules in other statutes dictating how to calculate those particular timeframes, some of which may lead to surprising results. The Waterfront decision is a perfect example of this - as a matter of law, applying the extension rule to the phrase 'no later than 7 days', the time to file a call in notice was seven days before the hearing.

For further information, please contact:

Annette Jones
Principal Solicitor
8684 0431

Lisette Stevens
Solicitor
8684 0475

Functus Officio - myth or reality?

If you work as a government decision-maker, there may be times when you want to reconsider a decision you have made under an Act.  Perhaps there has been a change of policy or you are concerned there was a mistake in the first decision.  What are the lawful options available to you to reconsider that decision? 

Options for reconsideration of decisions

The options available will depend upon the legislative context in which the relevant decision has been made and the nature of the decision itself.  At a general level:

• Where a decision is affected by 'jurisdictional error', it can, in many cases, be treated as no decision at all and revoked and remade (following the High Court's decision in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [1]).  Whether a decision is affected by jurisdictional error and may be treated in this way is a complex question on which we can provide advice.

• Where the relevant legislation sets out a formal process for internally reviewing decisions (see, for example: Building Act 1993 (Vic), Pt 11, Div 4, sub-div 2), a decision can be reconsidered in accordance with the prescribed process.

• Where a decision is not affected by jurisdictional error and no internal review process is prescribed, determining whether internal review is allowed (that is, without the decision being appealed to a court) can be a complex task, with which this article is principally concerned.

Indeed, this third scenario has recently been considered by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Minister for Indigenous Affairs v MJD Foundation Ltd (MJD).[2]

Background

Recent authorities on the source and scope of a decision-maker's power to undertake internal review must be understood in the context of the common law doctrine that a statutory power, once exercised, becomes spent and cannot be exercised again, without express statutory authorisation.  (This doctrine even has a fancy Latin name: functus officio).  The operation of this doctrine can prevent a decision-maker from exercising a statutory power in respect of more than one person or circumstance.

Legislation now seeks to avoid the inconvenient consequences of the operation of this doctrine, in provisions such as s 40 of the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic) (ILA) and s 33(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) (AIA), which provide that statutory powers may be exercised 'from time to time'.  The operation of these provisions is considered further below.

The Full Court's decision in MJD

MJD concerned the Minister's power under s 64(4) of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) (Land Rights Act) to direct that money be paid 'for the benefit of Aboriginals living in the Northern Territory'.  On the making of such a direction, the Act required an equivalent amount be debited from the Aboriginal Benefits Account. 

The Minister had directed under s 64(4) that a payment be made to a particular charity.  The charity then determined that it required additional funding, so sought to vary the size of the original grant.  Accordingly, the Minister gave a further direction that an additional sum be paid to the charity.  Before the additional amount was paid, there was a change of government and the incoming Minister decided to reverse the outgoing Minister's second decision (ie directing that the additional funds not be paid). 

The questions before the Full Court were whether s 33(1) of the AIA empowered the incoming Minister to revoke the outgoing Minister's decision and whether, assuming the provision operated as such, the Land Rights Act revealed a contrary intention sufficient to displace the operation of s 33(1).

Mortimer J, with whom Perry J agreed,[3] held that the Land Rights Act revealed such a contrary intention and that s 33(1) of the AIA had no application to the outgoing Minister's second decision.  This meant that the incoming Minister could not reverse the outgoing Minister's decision. 

Although that was a sufficient basis on which to determine the appeal, Mortimer J then made a number of observations about the scope of s 33(1).  Her Honour considered that s 33(1) did not extend to a general implication of a power to reverse or undo an exercise of power, whether by revocation of a decision made in exercise of the relevant power or otherwise.[4]  To the extent that such a power is to be found in legislation, the source of that power would be the legislation itself, rather than s 33(1) of the AIA.  The effect of s 33(1) is merely that, subject to any contrary intention, powers may be exercised and functions performed on more than one occasion, in relation to different individuals and circumstances.[5]

Victorian context

The leading Victorian authority on this issue is the Court of Appeal's, now 13-year-old, decision in Kabourakis v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria (Kabourakis),[6] which was cited with approval in MJD.

Kabourakis concerned an application for judicial review of a decision made by the Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria to hold a second hearing on allegations that a doctor had engaged in unprofessional conduct, after an earlier hearing had found that the doctor had not engaged in such conduct.  The relevant professional supervision scheme provided for the Board to hold a preliminary investigation, which it did, as part of which it received a number of reports from medical professionals that were relevant to the specific allegations made against the doctor.  Following the preliminary investigation, a panel of the Board was convened to hold an informal hearing on the allegations.  After the panel found that the doctor had not engaged in unprofessional conduct, the Board realised that it had neglected to provide the panel with one of the reports that it received during its preliminary investigation. 

The primary judge held that the error, a factual one, was sufficient to enliven a power in the Board to revisit the earlier decision (on the basis of the High Court's decision in Bhardwaj).  On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that Bhardwaj did not apply (because the error was non-jurisdictional)[7] and that the Board otherwise lacked power to revisit a final and binding decision about the doctor's conduct.[8] 

Nettle JA, with whom Chernov JA agreed, pointed to a number of features of the statutory scheme as revealing an intention that findings and determinations of the Board, which do not involve jurisdictional error and which are not challenged in accordance with procedures prescribed by the Act or by judicial review, 'are effective for all purposes notwithstanding they may involve reviewable error'.  This construction also reflected 'the requirements of good administration and the need for people affected directly or indirectly by decisions to know where they stand'.[9]

Having arrived at a construction of the legislation that did not permit the Board to revisit its earlier decision, Nettle JA also expressed doubt as to whether s 40 of the ILA would operate to imply a general power to add to, subtract from or reverse a previous exercise of the power.[10]

Determining whether internal review can be conducted

Ultimately, whether a government decision-maker is empowered to reconsider, alter or revoke an administrative decision will be a matter of statutory construction, which will require close consideration of the relevant legislative scheme.

Relevant factors may include:

• whether the decision in question is of a character usually understood as being irrevocable;

• whether the power in question must be exercised upon satisfaction of certain criteria; 

• whether the decision affects a person's rights;

• whether the decision triggers certain other obligations under the statutory scheme; and

• whether the statutory scheme provides for a decision concerning rights following on some process of formal determination.

Further information

The VGSO has extensive experience providing advice to government decision-makers on review of administrative decisions and can assist decision-makers to design internal review procedures and draft relevant policies where no such procedures or policies have been prescribed by legislation.  For advice in this respect, please contact Alison O'Brien, Assistant Victorian Government Solicitor, or Leveasque Peterson, Assistant Victorian Government Solicitor.

Alison O'Brien
Assistant Victorian Government Solicitor
8684 0277

Leveasque Peterson
Assistant Victorian Government Solicitor
8684 0462

This blog was written by Maya Narayan, Senior Solicitor, and Jack Maxwell, Solicitor.

___________________________

[1] (2002) 209 CLR 597.
[2] (2017) 250 FCR 31.
[3] MJD, [256] (Perry J).  Perram J, in dissent, held that s 33(1) could be invoked as a source of power to revoke the decision in question and that no contrary intention sufficient to oust the operation of that provision was evinced by the relevant legislative scheme: [62], [96].
[4] MJD, [100] (Mortimer J).
[5] MJD, [254] (Mortimer J).
[6] (2006) 25 VAR 449.
[7] Kabourakis, [4] (Warren CJ), [6] (Chernov JA), [43]-[46] (Nettle JA).
[8] Kabourakis, [6] (Chernov JA), [83] (Nettle JA).
[9] Kabourakis, [48] (Nettle JA).

[10] Kabourakis, [83] (Nettle JA).

Time for a change: Eight ways to get ready for amendments to the FOI Act

The passing of the Freedom of Information Amendment (Office of the Victorian Information Commissioner) Act 2017 has brought about notable changes to Victoria’s Freedom of Information (FOI) regime for agencies and applicants.

Victoria's amendments are designed to promote a culture of open government through access to information and strengthen oversight of the administration of the FOI Act.
The changes come into effect on 1 September 2017.

Contact us for the complete suite of updated FOI templates, available for a fixed fee.

Here are eight things FOI agencies need to do to be ready for the changes.

1. Shorter time frames for processing FOI requests

Agencies and Ministers must make decisions on FOI requests within 30 days, instead of the previous 45 day period.
With the agreement of an applicant, this time frame can be extended by up to 30 days, with the possibility of additional extensions, so long as the extension is granted before the relevant period expires.
Decision makers are permitted an extension of up to 15 calendar days for requests that require consultation with specified third parties (under sections 29, 29A, 31, 31A, 33, 34 or 35) before a decision is made.

Action: Update correspondence templates, FOI manuals and other materials.  Importantly, consider ways of streamlining your document searches, FOI processing and other processes to make them as efficient as possible.

2. New Office of the Victorian Information Commissioner

On 1 September 2017, the new Office of the Victorian Information Commissioner (OVIC) will replace the existing Offices of the Freedom of Information Commissioner and the Commissioner for Data Protection and Privacy.
OVIC is an independent regulatory body.  It will comprise an Information Commissioner who will be assisted by two Deputy Commissioners responsible for FOI and privacy and data protection respectively.

Action: Watch out for updates and free training on the new OVIC to be offered by the current Office of the Freedom of Information Commissioner.

3. Power to review decisions of principal officers and Ministers 

OVIC has power to review FOI decisions made by principal officers and Ministers.
The amendments also provide that OVIC can accept a complaint about a decision made by a Minister that a document does not exist or cannot be located, or a failure by a Minister to comply with new Ministerial professional standards (see below).

Action: Update decision letter templates to advise that review of a decision to refuse a document, or a complaint about a ‘no documents’ decision made by a principal officer or a Minister, can be made to OVIC within 60 days after the date of the decision.

4. Power to review decisions refusing access to Cabinet documents 

OVIC has power to conduct reviews of decisions refusing access to documents exempted under the Cabinet documents exemption (section 28(1)).
Conclusive certificates signed by the Secretary to the Department of Premier and Cabinet and produced to establish that a document is subject to the Cabinet document exemption no longer apply.  In any case, such certificates were not commonly in use.

Action: Ensure decision letters address the relevant factors required in order to claim the Cabinet exemption, namely that the purpose or a substantial purpose for creating the document was for it to be submitted to Cabinet (or a sub-committee of Cabinet) for its consideration.  Care taken to establish the basis of a Cabinet exemption from the outset (including evidence of the purpose for which a document was created) will assist in any review of a decision to apply this exemption.

5. Increased powers in relation to searches for documents

Upon review of a decision, OVIC has power to require an agency or a Minister to conduct further searches for documents.  OVIC may specify methods for undertaking a further search for documents, for example, by directing an agency to use a specified key word search of its email system.
In cases where an agency or Minister refuses a request on the basis that the work involved in processing the request would substantially and unreasonably divert resources or interfere with the performance of the agency or the Minister’s functions, OVIC can require a further search or that a ‘reasonable sample’ of documents be produced.

Compliance with a request to conduct a further search or produce a reasonable sample must be undertaken within at least 10 business days, however, this period may be extended.  Within three days after the conclusion of this time frame, the agency or Minister must notify OVIC of the outcome of the further search or retrieval of sample documents.  OVIC has power to refer a complaint back to the agency or Minister to make a fresh decision.

Action: Consider making detailed notes of searches undertaken for documents, including locations searched and key word searches undertaken. This will assist you should a review application or complaint be made to OVIC.
If you receive a notice requiring a further search or a sample of documents, ensure you comply with the deadline provided in the notice.

6. New coercive and investigative powers

OVIC has power to conduct an own-motion investigation into an agency or principal officer's performance of functions or obligations under the FOI Act. As part of an investigation, the Information Commissioner can compel the production of documents and witnesses to attend before the Commissioner to be examined on oath or affirmation.
A person served with a notice to produce or attend will have the same protection and/or immunity as a witness in a Supreme Court proceeding and will have the right to legal representation if attending to answer questions.
Non-compliance with a notice to produce or attend to answer questions without a reasonable excuse may constitute an offence.

Action: If you receive a notice requiring you to produce documents or appear before the Commissioner to answer questions, ensure you comply with the requirements set out in the notice and, if required, seek clarification from OVIC.

7. Documents that may prejudice an IBAC investigation

Agencies and Ministers should be aware that documents in their possession, which would (or would be reasonably likely to) prejudice or adversely affect IBAC's investigations or informants, are exempt.

Action: If you identify such a document, notify IBAC that you have received a request for access to the document and seek IBAC's view as to whether the document should be disclosed.
Consider preparing a policy and provide training to decision makers to ensure compliance with this requirement.

8. Reduced time limit for agencies and Ministers to apply for review

While FOI applicants continue to have 60 days to lodge a VCAT review application for an OVIC decision, the time frame for an agency or Minister to lodge a VCAT review application is 14 days.

9. Professional standards for decision makers

OVIC will implement professional standards which will operate like a code of conduct to ensure FOI decision makers meet minimum standards for dealing with applicants, conducting document searches, processing requests and engaging in timely and good decision making. The standards are binding on agencies and principal officers.  Principal officers are also responsible for ensuring that all officers and employees are informed about the standards and for ensuring compliance by junior staff.
The standards do not automatically apply to staff in Ministerial offices, but the Premier has the power to adopt the standards (with modifications, if needed) and apply them to Ministers and their staff (Ministerial Standards).

Action:  You may receive an invitation from OVIC inviting your agency to participate in a consultation process for the development of the standards.
Provide training for your FOI decision makers and staff to ensure compliance with the new standards. 

Ensure your agency’s current practices comply with not only the legal requirements but also the 'spirit’ of the FOI Act.

This blog was prepared by Joanne Kummrow and Samudhya Jayasekara with the assistance of Milli Allan.

For further information on FOI matters contact:

Joanne Kummrow 
8684 0462

Andrew Field 
8684 0889

Michele Rowland
8684 0413

Kay Chan
8684 4020

Attorney-General v Honourable Mark Dreyfus: When can burdensome freedom of information requests be refused?

Freedom of information (FOI) schemes in both Victoria and the Commonwealth give public entities the power to refuse unreasonably burdensome FOI requests.  In the case of agencies, requests may be refused where they would substantially and unreasonably divert the resources of the agency from its other operations. In the case of ministers, requests may be refused where they would substantially and unreasonably interfere with the performance of the minister's functions. 

A recent decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court, Attorney-General v Honourable Mark Dreyfus [2016]FCAFC 119, provides guidance as to when a request can be refused on this ground.

The decision, which was handed down on 6 September, concerned an FOI request made by the Hon Mark Dreyfus, a Member of the Commonwealth Parliament, seeking access to the diary entries of Commonwealth Attorney-General George Brandis.  Mr Dreyfus requested entries for the period 18 September 2013 to 12 May 2014 in a 'weekly agenda' format.  The diary entries were generally brief, containing the time of the meeting, the person to be met and occasionally a short description. 

The Attorney-General initially refused the request, on the basis that processing it would 'substantially and unreasonably interfere' with the performance of his functions.  The Attorney-General estimated that the process would take around 630 hours, including time spent gathering information that could not be gleaned from the entries alone and consulting with third parties mentioned in the entries.

The Administrative Appeals Tribunal set aside the Attorney-General's decision, a finding that the Full Court of the Federal Court upheld. 

The Federal Court's decision turned on the following two questions:

• When would the Attorney-General be required to consider extrinsic documents in determining whether a claimed diary entry could be released?
•  When would the Attorney-General be required consult with third parties to determine whether such a party might wish to claim an exemption?

In relation to both questions, the Court held that the Attorney-General would only be required to consider extrinsic documents or consult with third parties if it appeared from the face of the entries that this would be necessary.  The Court found that most of the entries did not require this.  The request could not, therefore, be rejected for substantial and unreasonable interference with the performance of the Attorney-General functions. 

The Federal Court's judgment is consistent with past determinations on similar issues.  In Fletcher and Prime Minister of Australia[2013] AICmr 11 (22 February 2013),  for example, the Australian Information Commissioner upheld a request for access to cross-bench meeting entries in the Prime Minister's diary for the period of about one year.

The decision is a useful reminder for public entities to adopt a pragmatic approach when considering whether a FOI request would be a substantial and unreasonable diversion of resources, and to keep in mind that it will be necessary to prove, with persuasive evidence, to the Freedom of Information Commissioner, or VCAT, that any claim that the processing of a particular FOI request would constitute a substantial and unreasonable diversion of resources would in fact do so.

Penina Berkovic 

Acting Managing Principal Solicitor

Andrew Field 

Managing Principal Solicitor

What to do if you are contacted by IBAC

Since being established in 2012, the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission's (IBAC) operations are in full swing. It has conducted a range of both private and public investigations. VGSO has advised the State on each of the first three public examinations by IBAC:

• 'Operation Fitzroy' into allegations of serious corruption in the former Department of Transport and Public Transport Victoria;
• 'Operation Ord' into alleged serious corruption at the Department of Education and Training; and
• 'Operation Dunham' into the Department of Education and Training’s $180 million Ultranet project.

In the course of conducting its investigations, IBAC may, among other things, issue a witness summons or a confidentiality notice. As a public servant receiving such documents from IBAC, what should you do?

I have received a witness summons. What do I do?

A witness summons from IBAC may require you to attend and give evidence at an examination and/or produce documents or other things to IBAC. The examination may be conducted in private or public, or both.

If the summons is for an examination, the summons will state:

• your rights and obligations in respect of the examination;
• whether the examination will be held in private or in public; and
• the matters you will be asked to discuss at the examination.

If you receive a witness summons:

• You must comply with the summons. It is an offence to fail, without reasonable excuse, to comply with a summons.
• You may seek legal advice in relation to the summons without breaching any confidentiality notice that may accompany the summons (refer below).
• You may bring a lawyer to the examination. A lawyer can advise you during the examination and assist you to claim any rights and protections. A lawyer cannot answer questions on your behalf.
• You may discuss your examination and the IBAC investigation with other persons, except where:
• you receive a confidentiality notice (refer below);
• you receive a draft report;
• ordinary obligations as a public sector employee prevent you from disclosing the information; or
• the other person may also be called as a witness. Discussing your evidence with a potential witness may compromise the integrity of your answers to IBAC and the integrity of IBAC's investigation. It is an offence to hinder an investigation, including by colluding with other witnesses.
  

I have received a confidentiality notice. What do I do?

A confidentiality notice is a notice that requires you not to disclose the matters specified in the notice. You may receive a confidentiality notice if IBAC determines that the disclosure of certain matters would be likely to prejudice IBAC's investigation or a person's safety, reputation or fair trial. In our experience, confidentiality notices are not uncommon during an IBAC investigation.

If you receive a confidentiality notice:

• You cannot discuss with anyone the matters specified in the notice, unless IBAC authorises this, or it is necessary to comply with the notice, or to obtain legal advice. It is an offence not to comply with a confidentiality notice.
• You may only disclose to another person a matter specified in the notice:

• if you are directed or authorised by IBAC to do so;
• if it is necessary in order to obtain any information, document or other thing that you need to comply with a witness summons or confidentiality notice; or
• subject to some restrictions, to obtain legal advice or representation in relation to a witness summons or confidentiality notice.

In such circumstances, you will need to provide the other person with a copy of the confidentiality notice at the time of disclosure. They will also need to comply with the confidentiality notice.

• You may also disclose a matter specified in the notice if it has already been lawfully made public, either in an IBAC report or otherwise.

If you are an employee of the Victorian Government and have received a witness summons or confidentiality notice from IBAC and would like legal advice about your rights and obligations, contact your in house legal department in the first instance.

Eliza Bergin
Principal Solicitor
8684 0267

Greg Elms
Managing Principal Solicitor
8684 0414

Katie Miller
Innovation Counsel
8684 0268

8 things you need to know now about changes to the Aboriginal Heritage Act 2006

The regime which regulates and protects Aboriginal heritage in Victoria is about to undergo a significant change. The Aboriginal Heritage Amendment Bill 2015, which was passed by parliament on 22 March 2016, introduces a suite of substantive and administrative changes to the Aboriginal Heritage Act 2006.

The general scheme of the Act remains in place. The Act will continue to provide a regime by which Aboriginal heritage may not be harmed, other than in accordance with cultural heritage management plans, particular types of agreements or permits granted under the Act (or other exception). The key bodies created or appointed under the Act, being the Victorian Aboriginal Heritage Council and Registered Aboriginal Parties (or RAPs), remain (albeit subject to some new rules and altered roles). The Victorian Aboriginal Heritage Register also remains, but is given some new work to do.

Within that same general scheme, the Amending Act makes significant changes to existing features and introduces some wholly new ones. We highlight just some of these changes, which may be of particular relevance to Victorian Government departments and agencies.
Who to apply to for a cultural heritage permit

The Bill provides that where there is a RAP for an area, applications for cultural heritage permits must be made to the RAP for the RAP to consider and determine. The Secretary to DPC remains responsible where there is no RAP for an area.

New agreements for managing public land

Public land managers will be able to use a new mechanism for managing Aboriginal cultural heritage, called Aboriginal cultural heritage land management agreements. The new agreements are intended to remove the need for public land managers to apply for a cultural heritage permit each time they wish to undertake low impact works which are likely to affect Aboriginal cultural heritage.
The agreements may be made between RAPs and public land managers. Public land managers include a committee of management, the Secretary of DELWP, Parks Victoria, VicRoads, VicTrack, a water authority or a local council. The agreements are only available where a cultural heritage management plan is not required.

When to execute a cultural heritage management plan

The Amending Act allows a person proposing an activity to prepare a preliminary Aboriginal heritage test to determine whether the activity requires a cultural heritage management plan. The test can be submitted to the Secretary, who must then certify the test or refuse to do so.

New rules for access to the Register

The Victorian Aboriginal Heritage Register is the repository of all known Aboriginal places and objects, as well as the repository of details of agreements made and other matters. Access to the Register is restricted to specified persons for specified purposes.
The Amending Act specifies that additional people may access the Register, including public servants responsible for planning permits and planning scheme amendments. At the same time, access to sensitive information will be more closely held, and it will be an offence to use information obtained from the Register for an unauthorised purpose. Finally, Traditional Owners, through RAPs and the Council, will be able to nominate particular information held on the Register to be classed as sensitive and subject to extra protection.

New regime for protecting cultural knowledge 

The Amending Act creates a new category of heritage called 'Aboriginal intangible heritage'. 'Aboriginal intangible heritage' includes any knowledge of Aboriginal tradition, other than cultural heritage or knowledge which is already widely known to the public. Aboriginal intangible heritage needs to be recorded on the Register to be protected.
In simplified terms, it will be an offence for Aboriginal intangible heritage to be used for commercial purposes without the agreement of the appropriate registered Aboriginal party. It will also be an offence to fail to adhere to any intangible heritage agreement once made (but intangible heritage will generally be excluded from the other offence provisions).

New Enforcement Powers

The Amending Act empowers authorised officers, previously known as inspectors, and Aboriginal heritage officers, who are employees of RAPs appointed by the Minister, to issue a 24-hour stop order to protect Aboriginal heritage from acts that harm it, or are likely to. It is an indictable offence to not comply with the stop order. Authorised officers will also be empowered to issue improvement orders, which require the person to remedy a contravention of the Act.

Altered offences

The Amending Act clarifies and alters the existing offences. It will be an offence to act, or omit to act, in a way that knowingly, recklessly or negligently harms Aboriginal heritage. The Bill also introduces a strict liability offence of harming Aboriginal heritage (which carries a lesser penalty than the offences with a mental element).
It also provides that officers of bodies corporate may be personally liable for acts by the body in prescribed circumstances.  With some exceptions, the new provisions may apply to officers of statutory bodies corporate, so it is important to be aware of these changes.

Aboriginal Ancestral Remains

The Amending Act establishes a new system for managing Aboriginal Ancestral Remains (Aboriginal skeletal material). First, it requires all institutions to report on any remains in their collections to the Victorian Aboriginal Heritage Council within two years of commencement of the Act. This requirement applies to all museums, hospitals and other state agencies and institutions.

Second, the Amending Act requires all remains to be returned to the Council for its management. If the Council, or relevant Traditional Owner, is not able to care for the remains, they are to be deposited at Museum Victoria for safe keeping.

For further information please contact:

Mark Egan
Principal Solicitor
8644 0489

Mary Scalzo
Managing Principal Solicitor
9947 1419

Freedom of Information in Utopia

Many public servants would have tuned in to an episode of ABC's satirical comedy Utopia, in which the fictional Nation Building Authority muddles its way through an FOI request. FOI is an important part of government accountability and transparency.  The episode reminds us that responding to FOI requests can be complex.  This handy guide provides a quick reminder of the key steps to follow when processing an FOI request.  While FOI requests can be made to both agencies and Ministers, this post primarily deals with the former.

FOI in Victoria is regulated by the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (FOI Act), the Freedom of Information Regulations 2009 and the Freedom of Information (Access Charges) Regulations 2014. 

Practical assistance is also provided by the Attorney-General Guidelines on the Responsibilities and Obligations of Principal Officers and Agencies (December 2009).  Regard should also be had to the Attorney-General's Freedom of Information Professional Standards (2014).

Steps in processing an FOI request

1.      What are the criteria for a valid request?

The first step is to determine whether a request is valid under s 17 of the FOI Act.  A request will be valid if it is:

•         in writing;
•          provides information to enable identification of the documents; and
•          encloses the application fee, which may be waived or reduced if it would cause hardship to the applicant.

The application fee is 2 fee units, which currently totals $27.20. 

If a request is not valid, the agency has a duty to assist the applicant to make a valid request or direct a request to the appropriate agency (s 17(3)).

2.      How quickly must a request be processed?

Once an agency receives a valid FOI request, all reasonable steps must be taken to notify the applicant of the decision as soon as possible and no later than 45 calendar (not business) days after the request was received (s 21).  

If you work for an agency and receive an FOI request, but you are not an FOI officer, you should forward the request to the appropriate person in your agency.  You can find out who the FOI officer is by looking in your agency's 'Part II' statement.  This is a reference to Part II of the FOI Act, which requires that certain information is published and available to the public.  As an example, the Part II statement of the Department of Justice and Regulation is available online here. 

3.      What if a request is voluminous?

An agency may refuse access to documents if the request is so voluminous that processing it would divert the agency's resources substantially and unreasonably from its other operations (s 25A(1)(a)).  Before refusing a request for this reason, the agency must contact the applicant and offer to assist him or her to make the request in a form that would remove this ground for refusal (s 25A(6)).

4.      How is a request processed?

Once a request is assessed as valid, a thorough and diligent search must be conducted to locate all documents within the terms of the request.  This search can be conducted by the relevant business area of an agency under the supervision of the FOI officer.

'Document' includes a document in writing, as well as maps, plans, graphs, drawings, photographs, sound tracks, film, and any words, figures, letters or symbols which have meaning (s 5).

If the search does not return any relevant documents, the agency may determine that they do not possess any documents that fall within the terms of the request.

5.      What exemptions may apply to a document?

An applicant is not entitled to a document (or a part of a document) if an exemption applies to that document (or that part of a document).  Each document must be reviewed to determine if all or any part of a document may be exempt.  If an exemption applies, consideration must be given to whether the document can be released with exempt matter redacted (s 25).

Exemptions include:

·         Cabinet documents (s 28)

·         documents containing matter communicated by the Commonwealth or any State or Territory (s 29)

·         documents affecting national security, defence or international relations (s 29A)

·         documents of Court Services Victoria (s 29B)

·         internal working documents (s 30)

·         law enforcement documents (s 31)

·         documents affecting legal professional privilege (s 32)

·         documents affecting personal privacy (s 33)

·         commercial information of a third party or where the agency is engaged in trade and commerce (s 34)

·         documents containing material obtained in confidence (s 35)

·         disclosure contrary to the public interest (s 36)

·         certain documents arising out of companies and securities legislation (s 37)

·         documents to which secrecy provisions apply (s 38)

·         Council documents (s 38A)

Many of the above exemptions contain a public interest test, which is designed to balance competing factors in favour of either providing or preventing access to documents.

6.      What decisions may an agency make in respect of a document?

After any applicable exemptions have been identified, a decision must made as to whether to:

·         exempt a document in full;

·         release a document in part (with exempt material deleted); or

·         release a document in full.

Even if a document is to be released in part or in full, an agency may defer access if the document has been prepared for presentation to Parliament or a Council or for release to the press (s 24).

Notice of the decision must be provided in writing to an applicant (s 27) and must include:

·         the findings on any material questions of fact (eg, if an exemption applies), the material on which those findings was based, and the reason for the decision;

·         the name and designation of the person making the decision;

·         whether exempt information has been deleted from a document; and

·         information about the right to seek a review of the decision, including where to seek review and the time limit for seeking review.

7.      How can an FOI decision be reviewed?

After an agency has provided notice of a decision under the FOI Act to an applicant, he or she has 28 days to apply to the Freedom of Information Commissioner for review of the that decision (ss 49A, 49B).  However, the following decisions are not reviewable by the FOI Commissioner:

·         a decision made by the Minister or the principal officer of any agency (s 49A(3));

·         a decision refusing access to a document on the basis of the exemption under s 28, namely Cabinet documents (s 49A(4)); and

·         a decision refusing access to a document on the basis of the exemption under s 29A, namely documents affecting national security, defence or international relations (s 49A(4)).

A decision of the Commissioner is in turn reviewable by the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (ss 50(1)(b) and (c)).  An application to the VCAT must be made within 60 days of notice of the decision (s 52).

Applicants may also apply to VCAT for review of the following decisions:

·         a decision of the principal officer of an agency or a Minister refusing to grant access to a document in accordance with a request (s 50(1)(a));

·         a decision of an agency refusing to grant access to a document in accordance with a request, if the FOI Commissioner has made a determination under s 49G(1) not to accept an application for review or has dismissed a review (s 50(1)(d)).

·         a decision of an agency refusing to grant access to a document that is claimed to be exempt under s 28 (Cabinet documents) or s 29A (documents affecting national security, defence or international relations) (s 50(1)(e)).

·         a decision under s 24 by the principal officer of an agency or a Minister deferring the provision of access to a document (s 50(1)(f)).

·         a decision as to the amount of a charge that is required to be paid before access to a document is granted, if the FOI Commissioner has certified that the matter is one of the sufficient importance for VCAT to consider (s 50(1)(g)).

A decision of VCAT is also reviewable by the Supreme Court on an error of law.

Proposed Office of the Public Access Counsellor

The Government has also indicated its intention to create a new Office of the Public Access Counsellor, which will replace the Office of the FOI Commissioner.  The Special Minister of State has informed the Legislative Council that the Office will be established in 2016 and work has commenced to prepare the required legislation.  

The Office of the Public Access Counsellor will:

•  have the ability to review ministerial and departmental decisions to not release documents under the Cabinet-in-Confidence exemption;
• set FOI standards; and
• have a broader mandate to help Victorians understand how to access government information.

VGSO's FOI experts can help Victorian government bodies to respond to FOI requests.  We can also assist with reviews of an FOI decision before the FOI Commissioner, VCAT or the Supreme Court.

Janine Hebiton

Managing Principal Solicitor

8684 0450

janine.hebiton@vgso.vic.gov.au

Michele Rowland

Principal Solicitor

8684 0413

michele.rowland@vgso.vic.gov.au

A civil penalty is not a criminal sentence by any other name

Regulators' speaking roles in civil penalty determinations restored by the High Court

Last week, the High Court delivered an important judgment for regulators in civil penalty proceedings.  In Commonwealth of Australia v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate; CFMEU and Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate, the High Court unanimously held that Courts are not precluded from considering and, if appropriate, imposing civil penalties that are agreed between the parties. 

What's new about that?  Isn't that the way it always works?

Not exactly.  In May this year, the Full Court of the Federal Court significantly constrained the ability of Courts (and potentially Tribunals) to consider and give effect to agreements between regulators and other parties about the suitable penalty for a regulatory breach.  

As many of our State clients would know (and as the High Court has now said is sound practice) in a multitude of regulatory proceedings - from breaches of employment awards to director’s duties – regulators as diverse as the Fair Work Ombudsman to ASIC had often reached agreement with an accused on a form of civil penalty.  That agreement was then proposed to the courts who, if it was considered appropriate, imposed the agreed penalty.  Trial times were shortened and, among other things, the regulators’ resources could be put to other uses, such as monitoring compliance. 

With the Full Court’s decision, however, this longstanding practice was held to be unlawful.  For the Full Court, the task of ordering a civil penalty was very much like imposing a criminal sentence.  As a result, it applied the principle in Barbaro, which prohibits a criminal prosecutor from making submissions as to the appropriate sentencing range or ultimate sentencing outcome, to the civil penalty context.  At the heart of the Court's concern was the idea that by agreeing on a penalty, parties may 'bind the Court' to make their preferred order and undermine its role in determining an appropriate penalty. 

Since May, then, real questions have existed in many jurisdictions about the lawfulness of regulators’ speaking roles in any civil penalty determination.  Were regulators to be like prosecutors – silent and dispassionate? Or, alternatively -  invested, knowledgeable, agencies with a range of unlawful conduct expertly in their sights?  

High Court Decision

On appeal, the High Court determined unanimously that, in civil penalty proceedings, courts are not precluded from considering and, if appropriate, imposing penalties that are agreed between the parties.   While the High Court noted that there was some similarity between the task of imposing civil and criminal penalties – the tasks are, it said, fundamentally of a different character.  The Court rejected any attempt to apply Barbaro to civil penalty proceedings.  Moreover, the Court held that a court is not bound by the penalty suggested by the parties, reiterating that it must ask 'whether their proposal can be accepted as fixing an appropriate amount'.  The judgments also spend considerable time endorsing the traditional model of regulator agreement and regulators' speaking role when proposing the terms and quantum of a penalty, stating:

• there is important public policy involved in promoting predictability of outcome in civil proceedings;
• the practice of receiving and, if appropriate, accepting agreed penalty submissions increases the predictability of outcomes for regulators and wrongdoers; and
• it must be accepted that judges will do their duty, as they have been sworn to do, and reject any agreed penalty submission if not satisfied that what is proposed is appropriate.

For advice on regulatory proceedings and civil penalties, now the silence has been lifted, contact:

Greg Elms

Managing Principal Solicitor

8684 0414

greg.elms@vgso.vic.gov.au 

Janine Hebiton

Managing Principal Solicitor

8684 0450

janine.hebiton@vgso.vic.gov.au

Plan Melbourne 2016

What are the issues of relevance to me?

The Victorian Government has released a discussion paper on the refresh of Plan Melbourne.

Plan Melbourne 2016 will be published in the first half of next year, and will build on Plan Melbourne 2014.  On 18 June 2014, we reported on the adoption of Plan Melbourne which was subsequently incorporated into the Victoria Planning Provisions.  The Ministerial Advisory Committee that advised on Plan Melbourne has been reappointed to advise on the refresh.

The discussion paper reflects the Government's commitments and priorities and canvasses options for changes in planning policy and strategy.  It covers a range of key issues including housing and investment.  Of particular relevance to our clients is the discussion of improved environmental sustainability and planning for transport.

Environmental sustainability and climate change

The discussion paper emphasises sustainability as a key concept in the Plan Melbourne refresh.  Driving this part of the commentary are the CSIRO and Bureau of Meteorology[1] projections of increases in temperature and changing patterns of rainfall and more extreme weather events such as drought and bushfires, heatwaves, flooding and increased coastal inundation. 

The discussion paper suggests that a 'more sustainable polycentric city model' is preferable to contain urban growth within a permanent urban growth boundary.  It is also suggested that Plan Melbourne 2016 might support the 'greening' of the city, by structuring planning, local policies and overlays to promote more vegetation cover and cool hard surfaces.  Clarification of the limits to the 20-minute neighbourhood is also expected in Plan Melbourne 2016.

Once finalised, Plan Melbourne 2016 will sit alongside other key components of current and existing legislation, policy and plans in Victoria on the topic of climate change and environmental sustainability, many of which are under review:

·         Climate Change Act 2010, under review by an Independent Panel;

·         Climate Change Adaptation Plan, for which consultation is planned in early 2016;

·         Victorian Energy Efficiency Target Act 2007, recently amended;

·         Renewable Energy Action Plan, currently being developed;

·         Energy Efficiency and Productivity Strategy, to be released later this year;

·         revised Draft Victorian Floodplain Management Strategy, released in June 2015 and expected to be finalised by the end of 2015;

·         State Water Plan, to be released in 2016.

Transport Planning

Plan Melbourne 2016 will reflect the Government's transport priorities and commitments, including:

·         the Melbourne Metro Rail Project;

·         the removal of 50 metropolitan level crossings;

·         the Mernda Rail Extension; and

·         commitments to expand the bus network.

The discussion paper recognises that potential road initiatives such as connecting the Eastern Freeway and the Metropolitan Ring Road require further assessment.

Although Plan Melbourne 2014 committed to a second container port at Hastings, Plan Melbourne 2016 will leave open different options for the most appropriate site for a second container port, including locations at Bay West and Hastings.  Infrastructure Victoria will independently advise the government on this.

What are the next steps?

We will continue to update clients on this process.  Comments and submissions on the refresh of Plan Melbourne are invited until Friday 18 December 2015.  Please contact us if you would like assistance with preparing your submission.

Natasha Maugueret

Managing Principal Solicitor

8684 0402

natasha.maugueret@vgso.vic.gov.au

Eliza Bergin

Principal Solicitor

8684 0267

eliza.bergin@vgso.vic.gov.au

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[1] Bureau of Meteorology (2014) 'State of the Climate 2014'.

Making sense of 'nuisance': Fertility Control Clinic v Melbourne City Council

The picketing of abortion clinics has been a hot button issue for many years in the US. Those protests are often portrayed as a 'clash' of rights between religious freedom and peaceful assembly on one hand, and a woman's right to privacy and control of her body on the other.

However, the recent Supreme Court decision in Fertility Control Clinic v Melbourne City Council shows that the extent to which rights are protected will often turn on the nature and scope of a decision maker's power under legislation.

The case also demonstrates that even though a decision maker may make a legal error, that doesn't necessarily give rise to a legal remedy.

A nuisance?

The Fertility Control Clinic provides pregnancy termination (among other services) at a private clinic in East Melbourne. For at least a decade, members of a religious group called the 'Helpers of God's Precious Infants' (or 'HoGPI', for short) have gathered outside.

The Clinic contacted Melbourne City Council claiming that HoGPI had engaged in nuisance by, among other things, harassing women as they entered the clinic, trying to block access to the clinic, and singing loudly outside consultation rooms.

In Victoria, councils have a duty to investigate a nuisance in their district under the Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008. If a council finds that a nuisance exists, it has to take certain kinds of action under the Act.

The Council wrote back to the Clinic, stating that it thought most of HoGPI's actions weren't a 'nuisance' within the meaning of the Act (other than maybe blocking entry to the clinic), and recommending that the Clinic ‘settle the matter privately’ by contacting Victoria Police.

What the clinic argued

The Clinic brought proceedings in the Supreme Court arguing that the Council failed to discharge its statutory duty by misinterpreting the meaning of 'nuisance' under the Act. The Clinic sought an order compelling the Council to address the HoGPI protests as a 'nuisance'.

The Clinic also sought a declaration that the Council's advice that the Clinic contact Victoria Police did not meet the statutory definition of 'settling the matter privately'.

Errors by the Council were within power

The Court found that – even though the Council had made a legal error in concluding that HoGPI's conduct wasn't a 'nuisance' under the Act – the Council had not failed to exercise its powers under the Act, and the Council's error was within power.

In other words, the Council had performed its duty under the Act by considering whether a nuisance existed, even if it had made a mistake by misinterpreting the meaning of 'nuisance'.  Therefore, the Court didn't make any orders compelling the Council to reconsider the Clinic's letter or address HoGPI's conduct in any particular way.

The Court also found that the Council made an error in recommending that the Clinic 'settle the matter privately' through Victoria Police. Again, however, the Council's error was within power: the Council had discharged its duty by recommending a way for the Clinic to resolve the matter privately, even if it had made a mistake by recommending a means of resolution that wasn't 'private' at all.

The Court made a declaration that referral to Victoria Police was not a method of 'settling the matter privately' under the Act.

No reliance on the Charter or constitutional issues

The Council initially raised issues under the Commonwealth Constitution and the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 2006.

The case potentially raised questions of conflicting rights under the Charter. Section 38 of the Charter requires public authorities, including councils, to act compatibly with human rights and give proper consideration to a relevant right when making a decision.

Relevant Charter rights in this context include the right to free movement, and the right not to have one’s privacy arbitrarily interfered or reputation unlawfully attacked. 

Conversely, the following Charter rights of HoGPI members were potentially engaged: freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief; freedom of expression; and the right to peaceful assembly and free association.

The Court did not have to grapple with whether the Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008 was a burden on the implied freedom of political communication under the Australian Constitution.

Ultimately, neither party relied on those arguments.

Watch this space: new buffer zone laws

A Bill making it an offence to engage in certain behaviour within 150 metres of an abortion clinic has been introduced into, and second read in, the Legislative Assembly.

Victorian Government clients wanting further information or advice can contact:

CatherineRoberts

Managing Principal Solicitor

catherine.roberts@vgso.vic.gov.au

03 8684 0247

EleanorThomas

Senior Solicitor

eleanor.thomas@vgso.vic.gov.au

03 8684 0425